Opinion by Tweheyo Charles
Although the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has had an unmatched record in enforcing peace and security through reinstallation of leaders overthrown in military coups, this time the geopolitical context of the region doesn’t seem pleasant in the case of Niger. Below are some reasons why it will be difficult for ECOWAS to implement a resolution to use force.
1. Lack of support by the population
Prior to the ECOWAS-deadline of August 10th 2023 for military’s restoration of President Bazoum, Niger’s capital Niamey was locked by popular demonstrations in support of the coup leaders. This demonstration was a clear signal from the people (wananchi) of Niger to ECOWAS and other interested parties that military intervention was not only opposed by the coup leaders but the populace as well.
This idea of military intervention also received rejection from politicians in Nigeria and Ghana. Their argument is that military intervention in Niger will cause more instability by deteriorating the already devastated humanitarian crisis in the region. Nigeria in particular, borders Niger in the North, a region which has for long been ravaged by terrorism and civil conflicts. A war in Niger would mean a refugee influx in Northern Nigeria hence worsening the sub-region’s human security crises.
Consequently, absence of popular support for this intervention is likely to make it look like a war of ECOWAS against Niger. There ought to be a necessary amount of support from the population-both in Niger and in attacking states, necessary for the military attackers (ECOWAS) to do their will successfully.
2. The Wagner, Mali and Burkina Faso factor
While ECOWAS has military capacity to defeat Niger, the interconnectedness interests exhibited across leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger with Wagner mercenaries at the centre will likely result into a complex and dynamic armed violence to the entire region.
Niger borders seven states and Niger borders seven countries, four of which are members of ECOWAS and of which Mali and Burkina Faso have since been suspended due to coups as well. When ECOWAS threatened to use military force against Niger on 30th July 2023, both countries also threatened to support Niger with military force to counter any form of attack. In stating that any attack on Niger would mean a direct attack on them, military leaders in Mali and Burkina Faso expressed their fear that in case of a successful mission in Niger, the regional bloc would advance to attack them as well. So, to protect their political interests against the aggressive regional bloc, they would be compelled to wage a preventive attack in defense of their Nigerien counterpart against ECOWAS.
In addition to their personal interests, Malian and Burkinabe military leaders are representatives of political and diplomatic interests of the Russian Wagner mercenaries in the region. There is physical presence of the Wagner fighters in Mali. In events that Mali pledges to support Niger in case of any military attack, it’s very likely for a direct involvement of the fighters in Niger.
Since June 2023 in the aftermath of an attempted mutiny in Russia by the Wagner mercenaries, it is known that the establishment and operations of the mercenary group largely represents interests of Russia and Putin as a person. Whereas Russia has not been directly linked to the proliferating coups in West Africa, the similarity in the causes and posturing of the coup leaders including the urge to disconnect their states from former colonial powers (France in particular), is a signal that many outcomes of these coups play to the Russian advantage in the current perspective of the renewed scramble for Africa between Russia and the West. Thus, any opportunity to maximize its influence in Africa, will be effectively harnessed aggressively.
3. The anti-neocolonial sentiments
Like the case in Mali and Burkina Faso, anti-neocolonial demonstrations have been witnessed amongst the populations in support of their military leaders’ rebellion against former colonialist. France, having been a colonial master for most West African states including these three, has for long been perceived as an exploiter of their natural resources in particular mineral resources. Therefore, the growing popular support for the military rulers signifies people’s quest for change of leaders from those loyal to neo-colonialists to those promising an end to these exploitative relations.
This should therefore send a message to ECOWAS that any forces to reinstate the former neo-colonial loyalists may place the regional bloc in an inevitably uncomfortable position of trying to prolong the long-hated French and Western influence in the region.
What should be done
ECOWAS leaders ought to imagine the aftermath of the restoration of Bazoum, in case the risk is taken. After all that, it would be a difficult moment for Bazoum to command loyalty of the military because many senior military officials under General Tchiani are involved in this coup. According to Nigerien constitution, all would be charged with treason and it is punishable by death. This condition is actually sufficient to discourage restoration of Bazoum, considering what may await the coup leaders.
With lack of popular support, interconnected interests among the region’s coup leaders and the overgrowth of anti-neocolonial sentiments among leaders and populations, ECOWAS’ resolutions to deploy military means are likely to stay as mere threats against coup leaders in Niger.
ECOWAS should rather concentrate on exhausting diplomatic windows with Niger because as time goes, they strengthen their stay in power hence gaining more capacity to even dominate negotiations.
Tweheyo Charles is an analyst of politics and international relations.